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TAKING, TDR, AND THE TUDOR CITY PARKS:
FRED F FRENCH INVESTING CO. V.
CITY OF NEW YORK
Incentive zoning schemes, such as zoning bonuses' and devel-
opment rights transfers (TDR),2 have evolved in response to a growing
awareness of the conflict between sound environmental design and the
profit motive.3 Enforcement of these schemes raises the question of
1. Zoning bonuses are increments of additional floor space granted to developers who
include one or more specified amenities in their building to compensate for the density of
the project. Theoretically, the value of the bonus will equal or exceed the cost of
providing the amenity. See J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT 30 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SPACE ADRIFT] (discussion of incentive zoning as a tool for historic preservation);
Barnett, Case Studies in Creative Urban Zoning, in THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 125, 128 (N. Marcus and M. Groves
eds. 1970) (describes recent zoning incentive measures in New York City).
2. Where a property has not been developed to its as-of-right maximum, schemes of
development rights transfers permit shifting of the property's unused development
potential to another site. As a method of control, transfers of development rights (TDR)
can preserve a landmark or an open space while shifting the economically valuable right
to build to land where greater density is not objectionable. See Costonis, Development
Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75, 85-86 (1973) (analysis of the
policy considerations and legal rationale of development rights transfers). See also
SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 1, at 32-34; TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS (J. Rose ed.
1975) (examines legal precedents, analyzes proposals, and evaluates the concept of
TDR); Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban
Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 589-602 (1972) (presents TDR proposal involving the
condemnation of development rights as a means of landmark preservation); Marcus, Air
Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 372 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Air Rights] (history of the development of TDR in New York City); Marcus,
Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhat-
tan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Marcus]
(analyzes French facts, and TDR generally, using a three-dimensional concept of proper-
ty); Note, Devolopment Rights Transfer and Landmarks Preservation-Providing a
Sense of Orientation, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 131 (1975); Note, The Unconstitutionality of
Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Unconstitutionality] (discusses the eminent domain, police power and special assess-
ment aspects of TDR in a constitutional context); Note, Development Rights Transfer in
New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972) (considers impact and history of TDR in New
York and analyzes landmark cases).
3. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note I, at 28.
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when, if ever, the government must compensate individuals for losses
resulting from regulation of the use of property.
In Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 4 the owners of
two private parks5 sought the New York City Planning Commission's
approval of a shifting of development rights from the parks to an
adjoining site and a corresponding zoning change. 6 Alternatively, the
owners proposed to erect a building of the maximum size permitted by
existing zoning on each of the park sites. 7 In response, the city enacted
a zoning amendment8 permitting only passive recreational use of the
parks and requiring that they be open daily to the public. 9 The amend-
4. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990
(1976).
5. Id. The parks are located in the Tudor City Complex, a planned residential
community near the United Nations in mid-town Manhattan. The two 15,000 square foot
parks cover about 18-1/2% of the area of the complex. Approximately 8000 residents are
housed in the fifteen buildings comprising the remainder of the complex. At the time of
acquisition by the present mortgagor, defendant Ramsgate Properties, the parks were
zoned R-10, a classification permitting residential development. Id. at 590-91, 350
N.E.2d at 383, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 7; Marcus, supra note 2.
6. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 592, 350 N.E.2d 381, 383, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 7, appeal dismissed, 429
U.S. 990 (1976). The owners of Tudor City planned to erect a 50-story mixed commercial
and residential tower on a platform over East 42nd Street between First and Second
Avenues. The plan required a change in the C5-3 zoning of the area astride 42nd Street
and the transfer of the development rights of both of the Tudor City parks. Fred F.
French Inv. Co. v. City of N.Y., 77 Misc. 2d 199, 201, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (Sup. Ct.
1973). Besides raising questions of tunnel safety, ventilation, and traffic control, the
prospect of setting a precedent for tunnelling other city streets was disturbing in terms of
density and urban design. Additionally, the finished tower would have screened the
United Nations Building and shadowed or blocked much of 42nd Street. Marcus, supra
note 2, at 81.
7. 39 N.Y.2d at 572, 350 N.E.2d at 383, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 7. New York City used the
floor area ratio (FAR) concept to control the amount of building on a given lot. See Air
Rights, supra note 2, at 373. In contrast to envelope zoning, which precisely regulates
both the bulk of a building and its location on the lot, FAR zoning authorizes a maximum
bulk defined by a multiplier of the area of the zoning lot. It thus increases design
flexibility by permitting varied design configurations. See SPACE ADR[FT, supra note I,
at 80-82. The R-10 zoning of the Tudor City parks resulted in a FAR of 10. Under existing
zoning, then, the owners were permitted to erect a maximum of 300,000 square feet (10 X
30,000 square feet) of rentable space. They therefore proposed to erect a 32-story
residential tower on the north park and a 28-story tower on the south park. The proposed
towers would have blocked the air and light of other Tudor City tenants and would have
cast shadows over two public parks on 42nd Street. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 80-81.
8. New York, N.Y., ZONING RESoLunroN art. IX, ch. 1, § 91.00 (1973).
9. 39 N.Y.2d at 592, 350 N.E.2d at 384, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8. The zoning amend-
ment established Special Park District "P" which was "designed to promote the pub-
lic interest, general welfare and environmental amenities, by requiring the owner to
continue the parks as a passive recreational area with lighting, planting, landscaping and
sitting areas for the public from 6 A.M. to 10 P.M. daily." Fred F. French Inv. Co. v.
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ment also authorized the transfer of development rights from the parks
to sites in a designated noncontiguous receiving area. t1
The Fred F. French Investing Co." brought suit seeking a declara-
tion of the unconstitutionality of the zoning amendment and compen-
sation for an inverse taking by eminent domain.12 The trial court held
the amendment unconstitutional and restored the former zoning clas-
sification but denied compensation, 3 and the intermediate appellate
City of N.Y., 77 Misc. 2d 199, 201, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (emphasis in
original). Improvements were "limited to 'structures incidental to passive recreational
use.'" Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of N.Y., 39 N.Y.2d at 592, 350 N.E.2d at 384,
385 N.Y.S.2d at 7-8.
10. 39 N.Y.2d at 592, 350 N.E.2d at 384, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8. Lots of a minimum of
30,000 square feet zoned to permit development at the maximum commercial density
located in an area bounded by 60th Street, Third Avenue, 58th Street and Eighth Avenue
were automatically eligible to receive transferred development rights increasing max-
imum floor area up to 10%. Increases of up to 20% were available with the city's
approval. Prior to any transfer, however, the city had to certify a plan for the continuing
maintenance of the now public parks at the owner's expense. Id. New York City zoning
laws have traditionally permitted the transfer of air rights between contiguous building
sites held in common ownership. Ownership in fee is not required; a leasehold of at least
50 years duration with options permitting renewal up to a total lease of at least 75 years
will suffice. Air Rights, supra note 2, at 373.
11. Tudor City was built and managed by Fred F. French. See Marcus, supra note 2,
at 79-80. When the property was sold in 1970, plaintiff received eight purchase money
mortgages in addition to cash. Two of the mortgages, totalling $8.8 million, were secured
in part by the parks. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of N.Y., 77 Misc. 2d 199, 200, 352
N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
12. 39 N.Y.2d at 590, 350 N.E.2d at 382, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 6. Inverse taking by eminent
domain (more commonly called "inverse" or "reverse" condemnation) is a procedural
device for recovering damages to property that could have been compensated in an
original condemnation action plus damage merely speculative at the time of such an
action that is used when the sovereign fails to initiate eminent domain proceedings. See
Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility,
1966 Wis. L. REV. 3 (survey of inverse condemnation law). See generally United States
v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1946); Trippe v. Port of New York Auth., 17 App. Div. 2d
472, 236 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 14 N.Y.2d 119, 198 N.E.2d 585,
249 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1964) (owner asserting claim for property may be compensated by
inverse condemnation); Rice v. City of New York, 32 Misc. 2d 942, 225 N.Y.S.2d 65
(Sup. Ct. 1962) (owners received compensation by inverse condemnation for continuing
trespass by the city). See also Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of
Police Power and Eminent Domain by the Courts: So-Called Inverse or Reverse Condem-
nation, 1968 URBAN L. ANN. 1; Cabaniss, Inverse Condemnation in Texas-Exploring
the Serbonian Bog, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1584 (1966); Magavern, The Evolution and Exten-
sion of the New York Law of Inverse Condemnation, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 273 (1975).
13. 77 Misc. 2d 199, 203-04, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762, 766-68 (Sup. Ct. 1973). The court
found the zoning amendment violative of due process reasonableness standards on two
grounds. First, the amendment barred any economic use of the property, and, second,
the automatic transferability of development rights pre-empted the rights of tenants and
owners at the future transfer site. Finding no precedent for a right to compensation after
an unreasonable zoning regulation when the restoration of the property to the owners
1977]
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court unanimously affirmed.14 The city appealed, seeking review of the
declaration of unconstitutionality and by cross-appeal, French sought
review of the denial of its summary judgment motions based on inverse
taking. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts and
held that, despite the permitted transfer of development rights, the
rezoning of buildable private parks exclusively as parks open to the
public was an unconstitutional deprivation of property rights without
due process of law. The court held, however, that such rezoning did
not constitute a compensable taking.
Private property cannot be taken for public use without just compen-
sation. 5 Although this limitation on governmental authority was origi-
nally applied in eminent domain cases,'16 takings which require com-
pensation are not limited to actual physical appropriations of private
property. 17 The essential element of a taking is governmental action
which substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of private
was possible, the court denied the claim for fair and just compensation. Id. at 204-05, 352
N.Y.S.2d at 768. For a general discussion of the trial court's opinion, see I A. RATH-
KOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 6.12[a] (4th ed. 1975); Marcus, supra note 2,
at 85; Unconstitutionality, supra note 2.
14. 47 App. Div. 2d 715, 366 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1975).
15. "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
The provisions of the fifth amendment have been made applicable against the states
through incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (fourteenth
amendment due process requires compensation to be paid to the owner of private
property taken for public use under the authority of a state). Most state constitutions
contain similar provisions. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 1 § 6 ("No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."); § 7(a) states that
["Pirivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." For a
discussion of the constitutional provisions of other states see, 1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.0 (3d ed. 1976).
16. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, AND J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 105-23 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as THE TAKING ISSUE].
17. E.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (taking of
unexpired term of a lease); Cayon v. City of Chicopee, 360 Mass. 606, 609, 277 N.E.2d
116, 118 (1971) (value of property diminished after city announced that land would be
taken for urban renewal but failed to execute the taking); Old Colony & Fall River R.R.
v. County of Plymouth, 77 Mass. (Gray) 512 (1858) (compensation awarded when public
highway laid across a railroad); see 2 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.1
(3d ed. 1976).
[Vol. 14:283
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol14/iss1/14
THE TAKING ISSUE
property. 8 Absent action by the sovereign in eminent domain, a taking
occurs when an actual invasion effectively destroys or impairs the
usefulness of property.19 Similarly, the total destruction of the value of
private property for governmental advantage constitutes a taking.20
However, a reasonable exercise of the police power may regulate the
use of property without providing compensation.21
The traditional distinction between eminent domain and the police
power is that eminent domain takes property because it is useful to the
public, while the police power regulates property to prevent use that is
detrimental to the public interest.' In the landmark case of Pennsylva-
18. Cayon v. City of Chicopee, 360 Mass. 606, 609, 277 N.E.2d 116, 118 (1971). In
addition to physical entry by the condemnor or the physical ouster of the owner, a direct
legal restraint on the use of property will constitute a taking. Laws which by their own
force and effect interfere with the physical use, possession, enjoyment or power ofdisposition of property will provide the required direct legal restraint. See City of
Buffalo v. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 255-56, 269 N.E.2d 895, 903-04, 321 N.Y.S.2d
345, 356-57 (1971) (announced intent to condemn with resulting diminution of value does
not constitute taking in the absence of the assertion of dominion and control over the
property). See also 1973 URBAN L. ANN. 343.
19. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-80 (1871) (flooding of
plaintiff's land caused by defendant's dam constitutes a "taking"); accord, United
States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470-71 (1903).
20. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) ("taking" occurs where
government's appropriation destroys liens which owner holds).
21. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (established
constitutionality of comprehensive zoning laws); McMahon v. City of Dubuque, 255
F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 833 (1958) (refusal to rezone for
commercial use within scope of police power); Dennis v. Village of Tonka Bay, 156 F.2d
672 (8th Cir. 1946) (despite owner's desire to use lake front property for commercial
purposes, residential zoning was constitutionally permissable); St. Louis County v. City
of Manchester, 360 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1962) (county zoning ordinances lawful restriction
on location of sewage disposal plant); J.D. Constr. Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 119 N.J.
Super. 140, 290 A.2d 452 (L. Div. 1972) (invalidated zoning ordinance limiting number of
apartment units to 15% of single family residences); Connell v. Town of Ganby, 12 App.
Div. 2d 177, 209 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1961) (zoning ordinance not arising from a comprehen-
sive plan unreasonable exercise of the police power). Zoning regulations are limited by
standards of due process. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Village of Briarcliff
Manor, 208 Misc. 295, 144 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (zoning ordinance prohibiting
needed high-tension electric line invalid). Zoning regulations are also limited by equal
protection standards. See Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556,214 A.2d 775 (1965)(requirement that owners of corner lots remove or reduce to specified height barriers at
their own expense is confiscatory); Town of Hempstead v. Romano, 33 Misc. 2d 315, 226
N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (attempt to terminate non-conforming use as junk yard,
after failing to act for 18 years, not enforced).
22. See I P. NICHoLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42 (3d ed. 1976). Commen-
tators have suggested a variety of tests for determining when a taking has occurred. See,
e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HAv. L. REv. 1089 (1972) ("entitlements"); Costonis, "Fair"
1977]
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nia Coal Co. v. Mahon,23 this difference was held to be one of degree 24
and, as Judge Breitel in the French decision observed, subsequent
cases challenging police power regulations and cases concerning emi-
nent domain have used the same ambiguous terminology. In both
instances, certain governmental conduct was found to be a "taking, "25
yet distinct remedies have emerged. The resulting confusion has pla-
gued courts, counsel, and commentators alike. 26
The French court's analysis of the taking issue attempts to clarify
the muddled distinction between police power and eminent domain.
Judge Breitel suggests that the term "taking" should be reserved for
eminent domain cases, and that cases invalidating governmental ac-
tions on constitutional grounds under due process should use the
language "deprivation of property without due process of law." 27 This
method of analysis requires courts to separate the question of whether
a taking has occurred from the question of whether a challenged
regulation violates constitutional notions of due process. 28 An exami-
Compensation & the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land
Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975) ("accommodation power");
Dunham, A Legal & Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (1958)
(private fault/public benefit); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967)
("fairness"); Netherton, Implementation of Land Use Policy: Police Power vs. Eminent
Domain, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 33 (1968) ("appropriateness"); Olson, The Role of
"Fairness" in Establishing a Constitutional Theory of Taking, 3 URBAN LAW. 440 (1971)
("fairness" and "justice"); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE
L.J. 149 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Public Rights] ("public rights"); Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Takings] (enterprise/arbit-
ral capacity).
23. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court applied constitu-
tional limitations previously reserved for eminent domain cases and found a challenged
exercise of the police power to be a "taking." See THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 16, at
238-55.
24. 260 U.S. at 413. See THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 16, at 134.
25. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 593-95, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384-86, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8-9 (1976).
26. See note 22 supra. See also THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 16.
27. 39 N.Y.2d at 594, 350 N.E.2d at 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
28. A literal interpretation of the traditional notion that regulation which goes too far
becomes a taking implies that there is a continuum running from police power through
the eminent domain power. The function of the court in evaluating a challenged govern-
mental action thus becomes the determination of where on this continuum the challenged
action falls.
Regulation Taking I
Police Power Eminent Domain I
[Vol. 14:283
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nation of the resolution of the taking issue in the French case, how-
ever, points out that these questions may not be easily disentangled.
In deciding that the zoning amendment in French did not constitute a
compensable taking, the court of appeals first looked to the character
of the city's action. Relying on Lutheran Church v. City of New
York, 29 the court distinguished actions based on the government's
enterprise capacity from those based on its arbitral capacity.30 In
adopting the early view of Professor Sax, 31 the Lutheran Church court
stated that when government takes private resources for the common
good, it acts in its enterprise capacity and must pay just compensation.
When government intervenes in conflicts over the use of land howev-
er, or seeks to eliminate uses injurious to others in the community, it
acts in its arbitral capacity32 and does not need to provide compensa-
tion.33 While the French opinion fails to discuss this issue at length,
implicit in the court's characterization of the zoning amendment as a
Judge Breitel's analysis assumes two independent grounds of decision, due process and
eminent domain. This, in turn, implies two independent continua.
Due Process Eminent Domain
Reasonable Unreasonable No Taking Taking I
Under this approach, a regulation which goes too far becomes unreasonable and there-
fore unconstitutional. The question of whether a compensable taking has occurred is a
totally separate matter. The function of the court here should be to place a challenged
governmental action on each of the continua. Further, it seems clear that this process
requires the application of independent standards for each continuum.
29. 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1975).
30. This distinction had its origin in Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J.
36 (1964).
31. Professor Sax repudiated this approach in Sax, Takings, Private Property and
Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971). Sax contends that the problem is considerably
more complex than the enterprise/arbitral test indicates.
32. Sax argues that property is the end result of competition among inconsistent
economic values. See Takings, supra note 22, at 61. When government enters this
competition to enhance its own resource position, it acts in its enterprise capacity. Id. at
63. Maintaining an army, building roads and bridges, and operating schools and offices
are examples of government acting as enterpriser. Id. at 62. When government mediates,
rather than participates, in the competition among economic values, it acts in its arbitral
capacity. Here, the essence of the government's action is to set standards to reconcile
the differing private interests within the community. Id. at 62-63. For a discussion of the
competing interests in property from an environmental viewpoint, see Ausness, Land
Use Controls in Coastal Areas, 9 CALIF. WESTERN L. REV. 391, 418 (1973).
33. Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 128-29, 316 N.E.2d 305,
310, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 14.
1977]
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regulation and its failure to award compensation is the notion that the
city was acting in its arbitral capacity.
Even if one assumes an intent to apply the enterprise/arbitral test,
the court's efforts here are sadly lacking. 34 Although a meaningful
application of the test would require going beyond the face of the
zoning amendment, 35 the French court finds the form of the city's
action decisive, apparently equating zoning ordinances with the arbit-
ral capacity. 36 Before accepting this view, however, the facts of Morris
County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills 37
should be considered. In Parsippany, the township enacted a series of
zoning ordinances 38 which restricted the use of plaintiff's land to
unproductive private uses 39 or to public or quasi-public use4° in an
attempt to retain the land in its natural state.4 ' Professor Sax analyzed
the case in his article proposing the enterprise/arbitral test and found
34. It can be questioned whether the court ever intended a serious application of the
enterprise/arbitral test. Even in Lutheran Church there are indications that the test
would not be regarded as determinative of the taking question. In French, the court cites
the test in one breath and begins discussion of when a regulation-never compensable
under the Sax approach-becomes a compensable taking. Looking at the evidence of the
treatment of the test, it would seem wise to never choose to rely solely on an enter-
prise/arbitral capacity argument.
35. Only the consequences of a governmental action are significant in the application
of the enterprise/arbitral test. The fact that a challenged act is in a form traditionally
treated as a non-compensable exercise of the police power is not controlling. See
Takings, supra note 22, at 73.
36. But see Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893), where the court held
that the purpose, effect and operation of a law or regulation, not its appearance, would
determine whether it constituted a taking or an exercise of the police power. Id. at 584,
32 N.E. at 977.
37. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) (series of ordinances restricting the use of
wetlands constituted a taking).
38. Id. at 545, 193 A.2d at 236. The township's original zoning ordinance which was
adopted in 1945 put the property in the most restrictive residential classification. In 1954,
an amendment placed it in the "Indeterminate Zone Classification." The property was
finally reclassified in 1960 as a "Meadows Development Zone." Id.
39. Id. at 543-45, 193 A.2d at 234-36. Among these uses were: raising woody or
herbaceous plants; commercial greenhouses; raising aquatic plants, fish, and fish food.
Id.
40. Id. at 545, 193 A.2d at 236. As-of-right public or quasi-public uses included:
outdoor recreational uses operated by a government agency; conservation uses, includ-
ing drainage control, forestry and wildlife sanctuaries; public utility transmission lines
and substations; and township sewage treatment plants and water supply facilities. Id.
41. Id. at 548, 193 A.2d at 237-38. Since plaintiff sought a declaration of the uncon-
stitutionality of the zoning regulations, the question of whether a right to just compensa-
tion existed did not arise. Id.
[Vol. 14:283
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the township acting in several of its enterprise capacities.42 Despite the
facade of "mere" regulation, compensation was required.
43
French, while possessing the essential characteristics of Parsip-
pany, contains even stronger support for a taking claim. In both cases,
land was restricted to unproductive use in an attempt to retain it in its
existing state. The zoning amendment in French, however, opened the
property to the public and, further, imposed an affirmative duty to
maintain it for their benefit.44 The effect of the amendment was to
establish two public parks in Tudor City. Clearly, such an action is an
exercise of the enterprise capacity.
It might be argued that the transfer of development rights provision
of the French zoning amendment pushes the case into Sax's reciprocal
benefit exception to the enterprise/arbitral test. 45 The reciprocal bene-
fit exception embraces situations in which the benefits accruing to the
property owner equal or exceed the detriment resulting from the gov-
ernment's action. In such cases, Sax would not require compensa-
tion.4 A finding that the transfer of development rights permitted in
French would confer a benefit outweighing the detriment imposed by
the zoning amendment is inconsistent with the court's holding that the
economic value of the severed development rights had not been pre-
served.47
42. See Takings, supra note 22, at 72-73.
43. Id. The result of the so-called zoning law was to make the property almost as
much a part of the government's utility, park, and recreation system as if an interest in
fee had been purchased. Under the enterprise/arbitral test, compensability is clear. Id.
44. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 592, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8 (1976). See note 9
supra.
45. See Takings, supra note 22, at 73-74.
46. Id.
47. The court disposed of the taking question by finding that, while there was a
significant diminution in the value of the property, none of the additional factors
necessary for a right to compensation were present. In doing so, Judge Breitel failed to
discuss why the entry of the public into previously private parks does not provide the
physical invasion which results in a compensable taking. Instead, he merely stated that
there was no physical invasion of the property.
In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871) the first notable Supreme
Court "taking" case, the Court held that absent an actual appropriation for public use,
when an actual invasion (flooding) effectively destroys the usefulness of property, there
is a compensable taking. The zoning amendment in French destroyed the usefulness of
the parks. 39 N.Y.2d 587 at 597, 350 N.E.2d at 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11. Certainly the
distinction between land covered by water and land covered by people which equates the
former, but not the latter, with a physical invasion is not inherently obvious. The
strength of this argument alone seems to raise a duty for the court to elaborate its
reasoning on this point.
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The court's myopic analysis of this issue is clear evidence of its
extreme reluctance to find a taking.48 Although Judge Breitel's analysis
purports to separate the questions for independent decision, in the
future, consideration of the taking issue will be dependent on the
resolution of the due process question.49 In French, the court had an
excellent opportunity to find a taking by applying Sax's own criteria.
Its failure to do so indicates that in virtually all police power cases, the
reasonableness of the challenged regulation will be the decisive issue.
The taking issue resolved, the court employed a two step analysis in
its examination of the constitutionality of the French zoning amend-
ment. Reserving consideration of the effect of the permitted transfer
of development rights, the court first looked at the reasonableness of
Illustrative of other types of arguments the court might have considered are the
following:
(a) Since the zoning amendment forced a private party to provide an essentially
public service, was not the destruction of the value of the parks for the govern-
ment's advantage? See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
(b) Are not the required plan and the restricted use a substantial interference
with the use and enjoyment of private property? See Cayon v. City of Chicopee,
360 Mass. 606, 277 N.E.2d 116 (1971); City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28
N.Y.2d 241, 269 N.E.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971).
48. When combined with the language of Judge Breitel's dissent in Keystone Assoc.
v. State of New York, 33 N.Y.2d 848, 307 N.E.2d 254,352 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1973) (Breitel,
J., dissenting), this treatment of the taking issue points to the fact that the New York
Court of Appeals will rarely find an unreasonable zoning regulation resulting in a
compensable taking. (Except for de facto takings by public bodies with the power of
eminent domain, which do not involve unconstitutional legislation, there are no prece-
dents or statutory mandates requiring the compensation of losses resulting from the
impact of unconstitutional legislation.)
49. While the form of the French opinion follows the independent consideration of
due process and eminent domain approach, the perfunctory dismissal of the eminent
domain question indicates that the due process issue will be treated as a threshold
question. If the regulation is unreasonable, and therefore invalid under due process, the
eminent domain/taking question will not be given serious consideration. Thus, the court
is actually working with a single bifurcated continuum.
Police Power
Reasonable Unreasonable
Eminent Domain
No Taking Taking
The essence of the court's opinion is that no regulation can go far enough to be a
taking.But see Horizon Adirondack Corp. v. State, 318 Misc. 2d 619, 388 N.Y.S.2d 235
(1976), in which Judge Lengyel virtually invites property owners to sue to recover
damages for the temporary economic losses resulting from unconstitutional regulatory
statutes. Citing French, the Horizon court indicates that the possibilities for the recov-
ery of money damages for unreasonable zoning have not been exhausted.
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the rezoning of the buildable private parks as parks open to the pub-
lic.50 In the view of the court, such rezoning deprived the owner of all
his property rights, and negated the security of plaintiff's mortgages by
rendering the parks unsuitable for any reasonable income producing or
other private use, thereby destroying their economic value. 51
The second step of the court's due process analysis acknowledged
that the development rights of the parks represent a component of the
property's economic value. Since these rights were not nullified by the
zoning amendment, it became incumbent on the court to consider
whether the permitted transfer of the severed development rights
preserved the economic value of the property. In this case, the vari-
ables involved in the realization of a return from the transfer of the
development rights rendered their value too uncertain to meet constitu-
tional requirements. The court found that the city's action had destroy-
ed the economic value of both the underlying property and the severed
development rights. Thus, the zoning amendment was held unreason-
able and unconstitutional.5 2
Commentators have suggested that since transferable development
rights are granted as a form of compensation for private losses result-
ing from governmental action, the constitutionality of TDR schemes
should be measured by the law of eminent domain and standards of
just compensation. 53 Underlying the French decision however, is the
50. 39 N.Y.2d at 595-98, 350 N.E.2d at 386-88, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 9-11. A zoning
ordinance is unreasonable if it encroaches on private property rights without a substan-
tial relation to the furtherance of the public health, safety, morals, or welfare. E.g.,
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). Moreover, a zoning
ordinance is also unreasonable if it lacks a reasonable relationship between the desired
end and the means chosen to reach that end. Id. at 389. See also Salamar Builders Corp.
v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221,275 N.E.2d 585, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1971) (requirement of larger
parcels in order to space septic tanks reasonably related to minimizing water pollution);
Bd. of Educ. v. City Council of Glen Cove, 29 N.Y.2d 681, 274 N.E.2d 749, 325
N.Y.S.2d 415 (1971) (one acre zoning of school site as part of general policy affecting all
publicly held land is arbitrary). Finally, a zoning regulation is unreasonable if it renders
property unsuitable for any reasonable income productive or other private use, thus
destroying its economic value. E.g., Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d
121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1975) (landmark designation of building wholly
inadequate for business purposes of religious corporation unconstitutional); Shepard v.
Village of Skaneateles, 300 N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1949) (rezoning to prevent con-
struction of gasoline station in primarily residential area not confiscatory); Eaton v.
Sweeney, 257 N.Y. 176, 177 N.E. 412 (1931) (when zoning approaches the point where
owner is deprived of beneficial use of his property, the court should step in and afford
relief).
51. 39 N.Y.2d at 597, 350 N.E.2d at 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d, at 11.
52. Id. at 598, 350 N.E.2d at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
53. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 104; Unconstitutionality, supra note 2, at 1110.
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concept that development rights transfers are not compensation at all.
Instead, they are existing property rights which have been modified by
governmental intervention. The constitutional question of reasonable-
ness, therefore, turns on whether existing value has been preserved,
rather than whether adequate new and different value has been
created. 54 Thus the court avoids the questionable practice of using
eminent domain standards to resolve due process questions regarding
the constitutional exercise of the police power.55
The French case provides a method of analysis which divides cases
using "taking" terminology into two groups: due process "depriva-
tion" cases and "actual" taking cases. French indicates that the New
York Court of Appeals is likely to find the form of the government's
action controlling. Where the government is attempting to regulate
zoning, constitutional notions of due process will apply and the regula-
tion will be invalidated if unreasonable. Barring precedent squarely on
point, the court will turn a deaf ear to claims that invalid regulations
are actual takings requiring compensation.
The French court held that the uncertainties of purchasing a receiv-
ing lot or marketing the TDR failed to adequately assure the preserva-
tion of the value of the rights as they existed when attached to the
parks. Nevertheless, the decision openly encourages legislators and
administrators to continue experimentation in this area and broadly
hints that other transferable development rights schemes will pass
constitutional muster. In this case, however, when viewed in relation
to both the value of the private parks after the amendment and the
value of the detached development rights, the attempted zoning regula-
tion constituted a deprivation of property without due process of law. 56
Kenneth Barnhart
54. There has been some discussion as to whether the economic value of the devel-
opment rights had actually been destroyed. See 90 HAv. L. REv. 637 (1977).
55. See Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974). Plaintiff challenged a zoning ordinance requiring the
termination of non-conforming signs according to an amortization schedule. The trial
court had found the ordinance unconstitutional since it did not provide for just compen-
sation. 357 F.Supp. 466, 478 (D.Colo. 1973). However, the court of appeals expressly
rejected the just compensation standard and held that the zoning ordinance need only
meet a test of reasonableness. 488 F.2d at 121. See 9 URBAN L. ANN. 303 (1975).
56. See Costonis, Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York: Losing a Battle
but Winning a War, 28 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIGEsT 6 (No. 7, 1976).
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